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Abstract 
 
The link “modernization-fertility” is an important object for analysis. Modernization changes 
every society economically, culturally, demographically. I analyze the empirical data for two 
Russian regions based on Easterlin-Сrimmins theoretical model and make conclusions 
concerning the strength of possible modernization-fertility relationship in Russia. I consider 
gross fertility to investigate the nature of linkage between crude birth rate, infant mortality, 
share of industrial workers in population, net migration and regional differences in fertility 
response to modernization. The results show that despite regional differences in the speed and 
scope of modernization, different initial starting points and cultural background, two regions 
have the same scenarios of fertility responses to modernization – the same trajectory of 
development. Decline in infant mortality was important for fertility reduction. However, 
opposite Easterlin and Crimmins, there is no evidence that high industrialization level 
associates with lower gross fertility.  
 
Keywords: modernization, fertility in Russia, fertility in XX century. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The history of global fertility is closely connected with the history of modernization.  
Different studies have explored that major changes in mortality and then in fertility, 
accompanied by “sweeping societal changes”, lay somewhere near important milestones of 
modernization  (Bulatao & Casterline 2001, p. 1). 
How can we define modernization in this context? The answer is not as evident as it 
seems to be. The definition of the “modernization” concept was evolving with the evolution 
of living standards. Nonetheless, the history of human beings represents quite clearly that 
modernization is always a necessary condition for transformation of civilization to higher 
stage of development. And it is often viewed in the frame of “urbanization-industrialization-
globalization” link. A lot of societies have been evolving under constant modernization during 
last centuries (Western and Northern Europe, USA) but we are able to select revolutionary 
modern shifts with the largest impact on peoples‟ behavior even in those countries (Weeks 
2008).  
Although, the Scandinavian experience added new evidence and U-shape form of 
dependence was scientifically recognized, the majority of researches demonstrated negative 
relationship between modernization and fertility (Weeks 2008).   
Theoretically, basic explanations of fertility decline in the process of economic growth 
are universal almost for all societies; Russian is not a special case. Bulatao summarizes this 
explanations in eight points – “mortality reduction, reduced economic contribution from 
children, high opportunity costs of childbearing, family transformation, vanishing cultural 
barriers for childbearing, improved access to effective fertility regulation, marriage delay, 
diffusion” (Bulatao & Casterline 2001, pp. 2-3). 
 
 
1.1. The scope of analysis 
 
Russian history is a broad field for modernization-fertility analysis. The first reason is 
that Russian modernization was more rapid, artificial and concentrated in time and space than 
in the majority of other countries.  The second is that Russian demographic structure involves 
a lot of different cultural groups which makes possible to include cultural determinant of 
fertility changes as a response to modernization. 
Therefore, this paper aims to consider the main features of Russian modernization and 
connect its result with such demographic indicator as crude birth rate.  
Firstly, I describe socio-economic and cultural changes in Russian society occurred 
under modernization pressure in the 60s and 80s. We know Russia experienced two waves of 
modernization in the XX century. The first one happened in the 30s, the second wave came in 
the 50-70s. If the first wave can be described as a first step to mass urban production, the 
second wave was oriented toward full urban expansion and spreading of urban life style 
through the country.  These two waves of modernization seriously affected socio-economical 
portrait of the Russian society and different demographic parameters such as mortality, 
migration and fertility (Lappo 2001). However, the analysis is performed concentrating on the 
second wave. 
Next, I explore and apply regional demographic data available for Russia. 
Demographers concluded that Russia had finished the process of the first demographic 
transition by the end of the 60s with total fertility rate equaled two. Thus, I consider the 
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transitional decade of 1958-1968 and then the post-transitional one of 1968-1978 to compare 
the strength and speed of fertility responses. 
Selecting data, I was focused on the regions which experienced the fastest and deepest 
modernization in contrast with more traditional ones. Finally, I have chosen two regions – 
Nizhny Novgorod and Chuvash Republic. The Nizhny Novgorod Region had an important set 
of characteristics for analysis. It was modernized in the chosen period mostly through the 
development of military production and automobile industry. On the contrary, the 
neighboring Chuvash Republic was more traditional and agricultural with high influence of 
traditional cultural institutions on family formation and fertility patterns.  
I build regression model for N number of panel observations received at municipal 
level. History limits me in obtaining the necessary data in full extent. However, making 
several assumptions, I am able to use available statistics. The methods of data receiving and 
cleaning are listed below. Fixed-effect and random effect estimator are implemented to 
evaluate coefficients.  
I expect to find strong negative relationship between the modernization level of 
particular region and its fertility during this time.  Detailed research expectations are given 
below.  
 
1.2. Research question 
 
Obviously, modernization affected demographic behavior of Russians in selected 
years. However, I am more motivated to explore the strength of fertility and modernization 
connection. Therefore, I formulate the main research question in the following form.  
To what extent two neighboring Russian regions were different in the fertility 
responses to modernization.  
Additional research questions would be reasonable to add. 
What is the contribution of declining infant mortality, increasing industrial 
labour-force participation and decreasing/increasing net migration to the changes of the 
crude birth rate?  
Which years gave the strongest modern impact on the crude birth rate?  
To receive answers to the formulated questions municipality level data for two regions 
were collected and regression models were launched with the crude birth rate as a dependent 
variable. 
My primary concern is in the selecting the crude birth rate as an independent variable 
for the analysis instead of total fertility rate. I aware the risk of bias in case of using crude 
birth rate which is vulnerable to population structure. Nonetheless, some demographers have 
shown that crude birth rate in 1960-1989 was quite reliable indicator of fertility because of 
stable age structure during the period (Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983). 
The next concern is endogeneity. Studies of fertility response to changes in migration, 
infant mortality rate and industrial development are complicated by issues of endogeneity, and 
identifying the direction of causality can be not easy (Schultz 2004). However, I assume that 
infant mortality rate, the share of industrial workers and net migration rate in particular 
municipality are exogenous variables because of common system of soviet management 
existed that time. 
Keeping in mind above assumptions and restrictions, I am going to investigate the 
impact of such modernization parameters as decreasing infant mortality, increasing migration 
and the share of industrial workers on fertility. I‟m curious if the two economic regimes 
within one country – developed and developing – have the same scenarios of fertility 
responses to modernization depending on religion and traditions. 
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1.3. Thesis outline 
 
This work is designed in the following way. The first section provides an introduction 
to the topic and formulates a research question. Section two presents comprehensive socio-
economic background of modernization in Russia in connection with the main demographic 
indicators during the 1958-1978. The third section introduces the most important theoretical 
concepts in the field of modernization‟s impact on fertility. Section four deals with data 
sources and data description. Fifth section provides for the reader the methods and model used 
in the study. Section six shows the main empirical findings as well as the relationship between 
results and theory. The seventh section summarizes the findings and proposes suggestions for 
future research. 
2. Background 
2.1. Russia in the focus of modernization 
 
In the beginning it is absolutely important to define the main features of modernization 
in XX century. Looking at cross-section of the most modern societies, the researcher is able to 
construct a simple description of modernization: urbanization rates which go to 80%, falling 
fertility rates, almost equal gender proportions for tertiary education, higher share of service 
labor-force than industrial, increasing consumerism (as a consequence of developed consumer 
markets), higher share of paid childcare (kinder-gardens), increasing demand for personal 
leisure, art and etc.   
Russian modernization in selected years will be analyzed from this perspective. 
However, firstly it would be reasonable to look at the most important figures of Russian 
demographic statistics for XX century. Table 1 illustrates what Vishnevsky (2006) calls 
demographic modernization. He suggested that Russia started demographic modernization 
soon after the Second World War. Total fertility rate in 1959 was already 2.6 (quite close to 
the red line of post-transition equilibrium) and it continued to decline further. The share of 
urban population, life expectancy, divorce rate increased dramatically while the average 
family size was reduced. All these facts are indicators of revolutionary processes which have 
taken place within society. 
 
Table 1. Demographic modernization in Russia. 
Indicators 1897 1927 1939 1959 1989 
The share of urban population,% 15 18 33 52 74 
Life expectancy  
-man 
-woman 
 
29.4 
31.7 
 
33.7 
37.9 
 
34.9 
42.6 
 
63 
71.5 
 
64.2 
74.5 
TFR 7.5 6.7 4.9 2.6 2.02 
Number of divorces per 1000 population - - 0.9 1.4 3.9 
Number of abortions per 100 births - 16 10 - 206 
Average family size 5.5 - 4.1 3.6 3.2 
The share of population older than 60 years, 
%  
7.1 6.8 6.7 9.0 15.3 
Source: Vishnevsky 2006, p.114. 
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I have to highlight the fact that Vishnevsky has considered Russia as a lagging 
country in term of fertility transition, while Caldwell (2001) defines Eastern European region 
as a leading area with the most pronounced fertility decline after US in the first half of the 
60s. 
In the next sections I hope to describe the main elements of modernization in Russia. 
 
2.2. The structure of Russian modernization in 1958-1978. 
 
Starting to investigate the scenarios of Russian fertility in detail, we can arrive to 
important observation.  Fertility decline in Russia occurred in the same time with developed 
Western economies, or, even earlier, whereas Russian modernization (both economic and 
cultural) came significantly later than in Western Europe or USA.  
The very unique feature which makes Russian modernization an interesting case-study 
is strong ideological management behind it. The roles of wages, personal satisfaction, 
individual input, and gender differences in production were limited by the propaganda of 
collective efforts to achieve the best society in future.  
 
Figure 1. USSR’s GDP per capita, 1946-1980 (1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars). 
 
Source. Angus Maddison. 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the significant positive dynamics of GDP per capita. The data 
are extracted from A. Maddison‟s statistics for USSR, but, somehow we can distribute the 
results for Russia as well. Apparently, positive dynamics is not a unique achievement of 
Soviet economy for the moment, a lot of societies experienced substantial economic growth 
during the most of the period. However, the soviet growth was extremely rapid producing 
revolutionary improvements of living standards. 
Mostly, modernization during this time is connected with the name of N. Khrushchev 
and his policy. The majority of economists consider its results in positive way; and the list of 
the main modernization outcomes important for increasing the quality of living standards 
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usually contains the mass housing construction, limitation of governmental participation in 
child‟s education, the reduction of working hours, the huge financial investments in science 
and education, the spread of convenient life style – TV, washing machines, kitchen 
appliances, wide range of different shops. The growth of individualism and the freedom of 
choosing the residence within the country were substantial. All these changes destroyed the 
common system of collective behavior existed earlier; traditional institutes were ruined, and 
lead people to change their fertility patterns.  
The illustration of the main socio-economic trends for this time is given below. Figure 
2 reflects quite simple in this context evidence – decreasing CBR, increasing urban population 
as well as the share of population graduated from university. 
 
Figure 2. Socio-economic transformations in Russia, 1939-1976. 
 
Source: the graph was built on the data from statistical guide book “National economy in 60 years”, Moscow 
1977. 
 
Looking at the data displayed above, we can think about urbanization rate‟s growth as 
an important source of information for current analysis. Thus, I proceed with the 
consideration of the main urbanization force – industrialization. 
 
2.2.1. Industrialization 
 
Industrialization is an engine for modernization and its starting condition. Is 
modernization possible without any industrialization? Hardly ever, however, possible if the 
country purchases modern outcomes in exchange for its natural resources. Nonetheless, 
Russian modernization in XX century was based exclusively on the intensive internal 
industrialization. Thus, I present briefly the main industrial characteristics of Russia in 
selected time. 
It can be important to note once again, that Russian industrialization moved through two 
important steps. The first one can be determined as transition to steel, oil, hard industry; the 
second step was in nuclear energy development, entrance to cosmos, chemistry development, 
and car industry foundation. The second step was made in the 60s and the 70s – time of my 
study (Vishnevsky 2006).  
10 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates growth in oil industry, car production, positive development of 
retail sector. Agricultural production continued to rise, though the growth rate was not as high 
as in the case of industrial production. 
 
Figure 3. Production (mln. rub), 1940-1977. 
 
Source: the graph was built on the data from statistical guide book “National economy in 60 years”, Moscow, 
1977. 
 
Basically, the history of Russian industrialization is reflected in the history of new cities 
formation.  Mainly new industrial cities were the mono-industrial centers. As a rule, a new 
city had its own specific industrial specialization with the majority of people working for the 
main plant. Mostly, development of such centers evolved through the ladder pattern in terms 
of human resources – people from villagers were supplied to built the plant, then they began 
to work at the main plant, the final stage was when one more party of rural people were 
supplied to establish the infrastructure around the plant. In the majority of cases culture in 
such cities was still rural type culture and people used urban life style not in the full extent 
(Lappo, 2001). A great number of new cities, for-example Dzerzhinsk, Toliatty, 
Nizhnekamsk, skipped the stage of small city in their development. Such cities were designed 
initially as big cities. Even the names of cities built in that time contained a prefix “novo” 
which meant “new” (Novocheboksars, Novo-ogarevo, etc.) (Nefedova  & Treyvish 2001).  
Agricultural sector developed in the direction of industrialization as well. First of all, 
poor financial results in the majority of kolkhozes (soviet form of agricultural organization) 
stimulated government to start substantial investments in technical improvement of existing 
agricultural facilities in 1965. The supply of new trucks was established in the same time as 
the use of fertilizers was increased substantially. Secondly, the low labor productivity in 
kolkhozes and regional differences in financial results motivated government to arrange an 
enlargement in the 60s. Kolkhoz was developed to sovhoz. We can count 39 thousands of 
kolkhozes in 1963 comparing with 91 in 1955 (Luhmanov 2001, p. 297).  Thirdly, the total 
area of agricultural land has not been expanding further in the 60s comparing with the 
previous decades. Finally, Khrushchev launched campaign aimed to decrease the use of 
personal farming in villages. Private land was cut off at 19% in 1958-1963 (Luhmanov 2001, 
p. 296). Such measures allowed to receive an increase in overall productivity of agricultural 
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production, but at the same time leaded to massive migration to cities (Luhmanov 2001, p. 
297). 
Figure 4 allows observing the strength of changes on the labor market due to 
industrialization. The most important issue for that time was rapid growth of female 
participation in industrial labor force and especially in sectors with high concentration of 
human capital. Female educational enrollment rose dramatically. 
 
Figure 4. New labor market realities, 1965-1976. 
 
Source: the graph was built on the data from statistical guide book “National economy in 60 years”, Moscow, 
1977. 
 
In addition, industrialization shaped health system and cultural life in soviet Russia. The 
number of doctors in the country increased more than twice from 432 thousands in 1960 to 
996 thousands in 1980, the number of places in hospitals increased substantially also from 1,7 
millions in 1960 to 3,3 in 1980 (Vizhnevsky & Volkov 1983, p. 103).  
During that time people experienced revolutionary changes in everyday life, habits. 
They were under social transformation from physical labor to intellectual. Life rhythm and 
ecological changes in big cities influenced people‟s behavior a lot, demographic behavior 
particularly. Therefore, I describe urbanization and migration in more details. 
 
2.2.2. Urbanization and migration 
 
Massive urbanization started soon after the Second World War, but urbanization rate 
grew during the whole period of 1958-1978. Why is migration one of the most important 
variables to consider if we describe fertility? 
Migration affected fertility substantially because it changed the style of fertility 
behavior from rural to urban. The transition from rural to urban life style leaded to 
transformation from rural to urban fertility patterns. In previous section, I showed the main 
causes of migration. Detailed migration patterns will be given below. 
As researches showed, Russian urbanization rates were approximately two times lower 
in the beginning of XX century than the rates of more industrialized countries and the level of 
Western and Northern European states was reached only around 1980. Russia experienced 
rapid urban transition in the 60s and the 70s. The share of urban population was 50% in 1958 
and continued to grow 1% annually, reaching 73,6% in 1973 (Nefedova & Treivish 2001). By 
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the end of the 70s Russian authorities were concerned about depopulation of rural areas 
(Wegren 1995). 
As Wegren (1995, p. 878) displays, the process of depopulation is especially 
pronounced in Central Russia, Volga area, where my research regions are located. He shows,  
“ between  1959  and 1968, while  the rural population  for the whole  of  the USSR  declined  
by  3%,  in  the Central Economic  Region  the number of rural  dwellers  decreased  by  21%. 
Overall,  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  the  Central Economic  Region  saw  its  rural population  
decline  by  45%  between  1959  and  1989”. 
 
Figure 5. Rural population of Russia, 1959-1989. 
 
 
Source: Wegren 1995, p. 878. 
 
 Rapid migration to cities decreased rural population at ¼, and the total quantity of 
rural settlements was reduced at 40-45% in 1989 comparing with 1959 (Luhmanov 2001, p. 
241). Furthermore, apart from the population concentration in cities the process of population 
concentration in larger rural settlements was launched. Table 2 highlights that concentration 
goes in the direction of reduction in the number of villages with population 50-500 people 
(small villages). 
 
Table 2. Share of villagers with particular size in total number of rural settlements. 
Years Number of inhabitants (village size) 
1-10  11-50 51-200 201-500 501-1000 >1000 
1959 14.1 28.4 35.1 14.3 5.2 2.9 
1970 11.9 28.8 32.4 16.0 6.8 4.1 
1979 13.4 30.9 28.5 15.3 7.1 4.8 
Source: Luhmanov 2001, p. 242 
At the same time, the average size of big rural settlements (with population more than 
3000 people) rose from 4150 in 1959 to 5020 in 1989 in Volga Region for-example 
(Luhmanov 2001, p. 258).  
Evidently, the migrants‟ profile is very important for my fertility analysis too. Wegren 
(1995) figured out that the most typical migrant during that period was a woman in the age 
15-30. Next table reflects significant fact that women in the most reproductive ages of 20-30 
have migrated almost two times more often than men of these ages in the Kostroma area. 
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Figure 6. Age structure of Rural Migration in Kostroma Area, 1982 
 
  
Source: Wegren 1995, p. 878. 
 
The reasons for massive migration were evident.  Job market became too limited in 
rural places for the great supply of post-war born young people which were in years of work-
force. On the contrary, cities offered a wide infrastructure network with new kinder-gardens, 
hospitals, schools, clubs - massively constructed on every plant and factory. These facts 
explain the prevalence of female migration. Wegren (1995, p. 879) concludes that “rural 
women who migrated  tended  to be  in their  peak child-bearing  years, which in turn  
exacerbated  the rural  long-term  demographic  problem”. 
The direction of changes is reflected in Figure 7. Development of new mass-media 
forms (glam magazines, TV) helped to promote new urban life-style where the role of 
children was limited.  
 
Figure 7. Transformation of infrastructure, 1965-1975. 
  
Source: the graph was built on the data from statistical guide book “National economy in 60 years”, Moscow, 
1977. 
 
 
Figure 8 displays regional scenarios of urban transition in  European Russia. Nizhny 
Novgorod Region with the center in Nizhny Novgorod and Chuvash Republic with the center 
in Cheboksary are in my focus. The map shows that Nizhny Novgorod Region is a leader in 
Russian urban transition (it passes the freehold of 50% share of urban population in 1958) 
while the Chuvash Republic experiences transition much later and threshold is overcame only 
by 1983 (Lappo 2001, p. 162). 
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Figure 8. Types of Russian regional urbanization in XX cent. 
 
1 – regions with the earliest UT (before second world war) 
2 – regions with earlier UT (1941-1960), 75% in 1980 
3 – regions with middle UT (1961-1970) 
4 – regions with late UT (after 1971) 
5 – regions with different types of UT 
6 – regions without UT 
 
Source: built on the data from Lappo 2001, p. 164. 
 
To sum up, regions experienced different urbanization patterns. How has it correlated 
with fertility? Probably, further analysis will help to understand possible relationship between 
two urbanization scenarios and fertility outcomes. However, before I consider mortality 
characteristics of the population during that time. 
 
2.3. Country’s demographic portrait, 1958-1978 
2.3.1. New patterns of mortality  
 
Industrialization, mass migration changed mortality characteristics of Russian 
population as in the other countries.  Shifts in economics influenced evolution in education, 
system of health knowledge and resulted in life expectancy‟s increase. Male life expectancy 
was 36 and female 42 years in 1940, however, in the 50s it began to increase (Vishnevsky 
2006).  
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The main increase in life expectancy occurred before the 1965. Life expectancy 
increased from 63 in 1955 to 66 in 1965 for men and from 69 to 74 for women, and since the 
middle of the 60s was rather stable or slightly increasing. The increase in life expectancy was 
possible mostly due to substantial decrease in infant mortality rates. Infant mortality rates in 
Russia fell down more than twice in the 60s comparing with the 40s. The decrease could be 
observed until 1970 and then infant mortality was stabilized. From the range of all mortality 
indicators infant mortality rate is the strongest figure for modernization‟s evaluation. 
Modernization allowed decreasing death rates in some categories but, at the same 
time, it resulted in the death rates increase in others. The picture of mortality causes became 
completely different.  Mortality from factory traumatic accidents grown significantly (third 
group in terms of mortality causes for that time period). Whereas the deaths from heart 
diseases remained the prevalent group, deaths from oncology jumped up on the second place 
during the 60s-70s and were growing constantly (Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983, p. 108). 
Table 3 supports the evidence that urban life style affects the picture of heart diseases 
deaths. Increase in the 60s comparing with the 20s is significant. 
 
Table 3.  Age mortality rates from heart diseases, Russia (per 100 thousands 
population). 
Years <20 years old 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 >60 years old 
1926 24.5 37.3 72.8 151.5 344.4 1138.5 
1966-1967 3.9 15.8 42.1 111.3 333.8 2492.1 
1971-1972 3.6 13.6 47.5 140.7 408.5 2816.8 
Source: Vishnevsky &Volkov 1983, p. 112. 
 
Moreover, аs table above shows death rates from heart diseases increase in the 
considered time interval mostly in the older age groups – 50 years and more. Demographers 
explain that in the context of response to modernization‟s challenges and the appearance of 
modern stressful life style (Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983).  
Furthermore, comparison of rural and urban age mortality rates gives quite an  
important but predictable evidence - higher mortality rates in younger and middle age groups 
for rural population rather than for urban in the selected time period. Nonetheless, for the 
older ages (more than 55 years) mortality rates for rural were lower.
1
 As for infant mortality 
rates urban and rural population had also different profiles. For the rural population the largest 
share of deaths concentrated in first month and for the urban population the situation was 
different - deaths occurred in later months. As researchers stress, the second case is most 
common in developing countries while the first one is in developed (Vishnevsky & Volkov 
1983). 
2.3.2. Decline of Fertility  
 
Obviously, the decline in fertility during the 50s and late 70s was global decline. Four-
fifths of the planet population experienced a decline. We can find little evidence of decline in 
the 50s (except Asian Japan). Then Northern America, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America started to decline rapidly in the 1960-1965, following by Western and 
Southern Europe and the remaining regions of the world in the 1970-1975 (Caldwell 2001). 
The total fertility rate was declining steadily but not radically through the period of the 
1958-1978 in Russia. Table below shows that decrease in fertility is gradual in terms of TFR. 
TFR fell down from 2,8 in 1958 to 2,3 in 1978. 
 
                                                          
1
 See app. 9.2. 
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Table 4. TFR in Russia, 1958-1978. 
Years Total Urban Rural 
1960 2.8 2.21 3.52 
1965 2.46 1.93 3.27 
1970 2.44 1.98 3.29 
1975 2.41 1.92 3.46 
1980 2.26 1.86 3.22 
Source: Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983, p. 177. 
Thus, by the year of 1969 Russia transformed from the country with low-fertility to 
the country with replacement-level fertility. In the same group we can find Sweden, Denmrak, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine. US and the developed economies of Western Europe became a 
replacement-level fertility countries later, in the decade of 1970-1979 (Frejka & Ross 2001). 
Figure 9 reflects the TFR‟s behavior during that time. 
 
 
Figure 9. Period TFR, 1960-1995. 
 
Source: Frejka & Ross 2001, p. 220. 
 
Meanwhile, a remarkable process of changing in the age pattern occurred. Russia and 
its neighbors in the Eastern Europe gradually moved towards younger ages at marriage and 
birth (Zakharov 2008).  By the 1980s, the contribution of mothers under age 25 to the overall 
number of births rose to high proportion. In Russia more than 50% of the cohort and period 
TFR was contributed by mothers at these ages. By age 25, about 80 % of women had been 
married at least once (Avdeev & Monnier 2000). The proportion of childless women was 
quite low (4–7%) comparing with western countries. On average, “family formation began at 
early ages“ – the mean age of mother at first birth was 23 years old, at second birth – 26–27 
(Zakharov 2008, p. 918). 
The interval between the first marriage and first birth, is approximately one year, it 
“means that first birth has been not postponed”. Moreover, researches stress that the timing of 
the first birth was not regulated. As empirical studies show, more than 50% of pregnancies 
occurred before marriage. The attitude towards a two-child family was rather strong 
(Zakharov 2008, p. 918).  
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Figure 10. Proportions of women married at ages 20-24, 1930-1965. 
 
Source: Frejka & Ross 2001, p. 220. 
 
The tempo of family formation “was greater for those who chose to have more than 
two children, as well as for those who did not practice birth control on a regular basis” 
(marginal groups). The parity progression ratio for third, fourth, and fifth birth orders was 
almost the same - about 25–27% for those with one child fewer than the given birth order 
(Zakharov 2008, p. 919). 
Abortion and divorce rates are also important modernization indicators which influence 
fertility. The increase in selected years was significant. Undoubtedly, governmental regulation 
is very important in this respect. The new act was launched in the 60s which simplified the 
divorce procedure.  
As a conclusion, fertility in the period of 1958-1978 was influenced by new economic 
realities – more developed medicine, women health care, child paid-care, and increased 
women labor-force participation. Fertility already passed the pick of first demographic 
transition. And all fertility decisions were driven by two opposite energies – the first one was 
in new possibilities for consuming alternative goods, in active participation in industrial 
production, while  the second was in huge social support of parents and fertility developed by 
soviet government. It constructs for me more difficulties in creating fertility-modernization 
models than in the case of capitalistic countries. 
 
2.3.3. Ethnic differences in demographic outcomes 
 
Obviously, modernization affected fertility of different ethnic groups not in the same 
extent. Some ethnicities were more vulnerable to modernization. In this section, I consider 
possible ethnic differences in part of fertility outcomes. 
Before XX century Russia was a country with traditional type of fertility and 
differences in fertility between ethnic groups were absent. From the second decade of XX 
century the process of confessional fertility differentiation started. According to Vishnevsky 
and Volkov (1983, p. 135), in 1910 crude birth rate for “orthodox people was 47,1, for 
Muslim people 47,1, Protestants had 22,3, Catholics 30,5, Jews 21,7”. Ethnic differences in 
fertility continued to increase in the 60s, in first half of the 70s this tendency reached its 
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maximum level and then the process of differences minimization started. USSR statistics 
shows that in 1978, “for-example, Russians has the lowest TFR - 2.02” (Vishnevsky & 
Volkov, 1983, p. 187). The most significant ethnic differences can be declared for rural 
population. Also ethnic differences in fertility are weaker going from small to big cities. 
Ethnicities had very strong impact on marriage patterns and as a result on fertility 
outcomes. Researches declared that religion influenced marriage patterns in Russia since 
Imperial times. For-example Russia historically showed earlier age at first marriage 
comparing with Western and Northern Europe. But there were zones in Empire with 
«European marriage patterns». They located near the borders with Finland, Baltic countries 
with the majority of protestant and Catholics  – such as Leningrad Region, Novgorod Region, 
Arkhangelsk region. The earliest marriages had Muslim women in Caucasian region with 17-
19 years old in average (Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983). 
Ethnic differences are especially visible if we look at divorce rates. USSR studies 
allow concluding that Baltic people have the highest divorce rate and Armenians the lowest in 
the 70s. Starting from the 70s, researches observe decrease in marriage rates for women with 
traditional type of fertility. This could be connected with modernization shifts in society 
(Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983).   
I apply these findings to further empirical analysis in section 6. 
 
2.4.  Socio-economic description of selected regions 
 
In this study, I compare fertility as a proxy of modernization in two Russian regions 
located in Volga area – Nizhny Novgorod and Chuvash Republic. Historically it was a core 
area for Russian Islamic, Buddhism and Protestant cultures. And different ethnic groups lived 
there since the foundation of the state. After the Second World War the process of 
industrialization and modernization was forced in this area because of massive industrial 
evacuation from Moscow to the East. Former Moscow‟s and German plants were established 
there in order to start industrial production.  
Thus, industrialization which came from top administrative levels got contact with 
unique traditional cultures. How was fertility affected in this respect? To answer on this 
question it is absolutely necessary to look at socio-economic processes in the selected areas 
which were not homogeneous. There were more modern territories and more traditional 
depending on religion and ethnicity. This is the reason why this analysis is concentrated on 
two Volga‟s Regions. First Region is more modern Nizhny Novgorod Region and the second 
is Chuvash Republic which is more traditional. Figure 11 illustrates the place where Nizhny 
Novgorod Region and Chuvash Region locate on the country‟s map. 
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Figure 11. Nizhny Novgorod Region and Chuvash Republic on country’s map. 
 
Source: http://www.sibsiu.ru/ 
 
 
2.4.1. Nizhny Novgorod Region 
 
Nizhny Novgorod Region is one of the 89 Russian regions located on Volga River with 
the administrative center in Nizhny Novgorod city. The total population was 3340,7 
thousands people in 2009 and the share of urban population was 78.9%.  95% from total 
population are Russians according to Russian census and orthodox. Region consists from 47 
administrative districts (municipalities) and the map below reflects this administrative 
structure. The region is one of the most important Russian industrial centers with such 
developed industries as chemistry, military, ferrous metallurgy 
(http://www.government.nnov.ru/). 
 
 
Figure 12. Nizhny Novgorod Region and administrative districts. 
 
Source: http://www.government.nnov.ru/ 
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Regional data presented in the appendix shows that Nizhny Novgorod Region 
experienced rapid modernization in 1958-1978 
2
. First of all, the number of cities increased, 
because industry and agriculture experienced technical revolution during that time - new 
conveyers and automatic lines were set up. There were five cities with population 50-100 
thousand people in 1979, two big cities appeared on region‟s map in 1970 with population 
more than 500 thousands.   
Next, the share of people with undergraduate degree was almost doubled by 1979 
comparing with 1959.  Share of women in total labor-force volume was increased and reached 
54% in 1970. Such sectors as finance, education had highest women labor-force participation 
rates. In other words, the development of infrastructure as the second stage of any 
modernization increased women labor-force participation rates substantially during that time. 
Number of kinder-gardens was also doubled in just a decade of 1960-1970. New hospitals and 
women consultations were established in every municipality. This region was urbanized one 
of the first and by 1977 the share of urban population reached 72%. It is characterized by 
quite average for Russia population density – 45 people per square km. 
Finally, total net migration had positive sign in the region but the majority of 
municipalities suffered from negative net-migration in favor of core municipalities with big 
cities. Big cities such as Nizhny Novgorod and Dzershinsk attracted people from the province 
(50 years of Gorky Region 1979). 
 
2.4.2. Chuvash Republic 
 
Chuvash Republic is one of the 89 Russian regions located in Volga Region area with 
the administrative center in Cheboksary.  The total population was 1279 thousands people in 
2009 and the share of urban population was 51.1. 67.7% from total population were Chuvashi 
according to Russian census estimates. Historically, in the majority they are Muslims. 
Chuvashi and tatari usually are considered as living in more traditional life-style 
(http://www.cap.ru/). 
Region consists of 21 administrative districts (municipalities) and map below reflects 
this administrative structure. 
 
Figure 13. Chuvash Republic and administrative districts. 
 
               
Source: http://www.cap.ru/ 
                                                          
2
 See appendix 9.3. 
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Chuvash Republic has a common border with Nizhny Novgorod Region. And it is one 
of the most important Russian agricultural centers. The region has negative net migration. 
Nizhny Novgorod‟s municipalities are the most popular centers of chuvashian out-migration. 
Its urbanization rate remained low comparing with Nizhny Novgorod (the share of 
urban population) 45% and it is characterized by quite high population density – 70 people 
per square km. This region experienced rapid modernization in selected time period. But it 
remained more agrarian at the end comparing with Nizhny Novgorod. The role of cultural 
factors may be important (http://www.cap.ru/).  
The model presented later will help to understand the differences in the relationship 
between fertility and modernization in two regions. 
3. Theory and previous research 
 
3.1. Overview of selected theories 
 
Modernization theory postulates that there are two types of societies – traditional and 
modern. Traditional is society with strong traditions, high fertility, high mortality; and 
modern with strong levels of independence, low fertility, low mortality. In between there is a 
demographic transition from one society to another (Weeks 2008).  
 Related literature shows, as a result of improving living standards in the majority of 
western developed economies, the mortality rapidly declined in the middle of XIX century 
and was followed by lagged fertility decline. The fertility behavior was transformed by new 
social order, when urban life style gave more advantages than traditional rural. Economic 
forces changed the system of transportation and communication, lead people to increase their 
life speeds, thus, breaking existed patterns of family formation. The importance of family life 
was questioned because of collective social pressure and development of different institutions 
aimed to promote individualism and career oriented behavior. Later the same waves of 
fertility decline were observed in other parts of the world (Weeks 2008). Usually, it‟s the brief 
description of the link modernization-fertility in demographic literature. 
Discussing modernization, it is absolutely necessary to refer to Kuznets theory of 
modern economic growth (Kuznets 1973). Although it doesn‟t explain the link 
modernization-fertility, it helps to understand the modernization phenomenon itself.  
Kuznets (1973) lists urbanization and secularization as the main components of 
modernization. He stresses the idea that technological progress and the emergence of modern 
science determine modernization. Advancing technology changes the labor organization and 
the structure of labor-force. As a result, the relationship between status-groups in labor force 
is no longer the same. Economic transformations determine the changes in the structure of 
society – family formation, man‟s view on his role and his achievement in society.  
He describes the effect of mass migration from the countryside to cities, focusing on 
high prices of such migration. This type of migration is especially associates with the high 
costs because rural people should learn completely new skills usually connected with the 
machines. Also Kuznets employs the question of economic return – it is higher in urban 
society than in rural, thus, people prefer to migrate. Next, the position of group in the new 
economic hierarchy depends on the attachment to the particular production sector. Even more, 
innovations change these hierarchies with fantastic speeds. Kuznets indicates the problems 
which usually arise from modern economic growth and modernization. He formulates the 
conclusion that “the  most  distinctive  feature  of modern economic  growth  is  the  
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combination  of  a high  rate  of  aggregate  growth  with  disrupting  effects  and  new  
"problems."  The high  rate  of  growth  is  sustained  by  the interplay  between  mass  
applications  of technological  innovations  based  on  additions  to  the  stock  of knowledge  
and  further additions  to  that  stock.  The  disrupting effects  are  those  imposed  by  the  
rapid  rate of change  in economic  and  social  structure” (Kuznets, 1973, p. 257). 
I claim Soviet socio-economic background during this time is quite good empirical 
base for the testing of Kuznets‟s views. Nonetheless, I also need theories which can explain 
the micro-level dimension. How does the decision to migrate to the big city in the 60s 
correlate with the decision to have a child? What are the new costs of being industrial worker? 
Such way of thinking orients me to the direction of neo-classical economics and the 
most influential in this respect – the demand theory. 
The demand theory which was born in the 40s offered the micro-economic framework 
for the explanation of fertility transition and fertility responses to economic fluctuations after 
the transition. This theory is mainly connected with Gary Becker which emphasizes the 
importance of economic factors for the process of childbearing.  
Then some authors showed that pure economic approach is not so much powerful as it 
was considered in the beginning. Economic differences between societies which resulted in 
the same fertility decline broke the major postulates of the theory. Therefore, the need in 
complimentary explanations raised and we received the theory of innovation/diffusion.  
Several researches attempted to model the combination of economical and cultural 
theories. But the major tricky thing was how to combine them appropriately. This created a 
diverse field of sub-theories and empirical studies which fulfilled it in different ways. 
In this section I present demographic theories developed in XX сentury which can 
help me to understand the link modernization-fertility.  However, I concentrate the theoretical 
description on the theory offered by Easterlin and Crimmins.  The empirical analysis is based 
mainly on its ideas. Nonetheless, competitive important findings will be also taken into 
account.  
Many authors have stressed the difficulties to find a clear relationship between 
modernization and fertility because of family policies which government implement in order 
to manage fertility. Time and society I consider have not been involved in any significant 
family policy except basic social benefits.  
Additionally, I must admit, that this work considers two different time periods -  
transitional and  post-transitional. Thus, I am less interested in the conditions and factors 
behind the beginning of the transition. My case is to understand social reality at fertility 
transition stage and post-transitional stage of development. Therefore, I focus the analysis on 
theories which explain the transition process and its results, not focusing on the pre-transition 
phase. I explain the 60s as a transitional period and the 70s as a post-transitional period in 
Russia using the same theoretical background because the economic and social forces 
continue to influence fertility behavior soon after the transition – people simply have adjusted 
their fertility.  
I understand that Easterlin and Crimmins based their conclusions on analyzing pre-
transitional and transitional data. However, I suppose that their model is relevant even for the 
post-transitional decade of the 70s. From my point of view, fertility transition cannot be 
described as an event having strict time-frame, just looking at TFR‟s size. We are able to 
observe the echo of transition in officially post-transitional decade of 1968-1978. 
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3.2.  Economic or cultural perspective? 
 
First theorists of transition theory (Notestein, Thompson, Davis) were oriented to the 
side of macro-economic factors which influenced fertility (Weeks 2008). Bulatao and 
Caldwell (2001, p. 96) refers to the message of Davis “there is an incompatibility, or tension, 
between the family on the one hand and the industrial economy on the other. The fundamental 
principle of the family is ascription of status…The principle of industrial society is the 
opposite”. 
Gary Becker (1991) was among the first scientists who introduced microeconomic 
theory to the decision of childbearing. According to Becker, income affects fertility a lot. 
Fertility decline is a result of increasing availability of alternative goods, opportunity cost of 
mother‟s time, and the substitution of child quality to quantity. Modernization changes the 
childbearing pattern – children start to give more disadvantages than advantages for parents. 
Child labor in household is no anymore the characteristic of normal family situation, thus, the 
demand for children goes down.  The key word in modern society is “utility”. Many children 
are not associated with utility as a result of industrialization.  The only child‟s function which 
remains to be influential is emotional satisfaction. At the same time, modernization causes the 
diffusion of new living standards – good education, more advanced clothes and toys, 
therefore, costs for having children increase substantially. Parents are consumers which prefer 
to consume things with greatest satisfaction. The central place in Becker‟s theory takes the 
concept of mother‟s time. Theoretically speaking, its distribution in time and space is a 
function of her economic status in society. According to such view, a woman, who has regular 
paid work as a result of modernization, distributes less time to her children. 
Becker‟s conclusion is that developed consumer market leads people to refuse of 
having children. But what if people don‟t refuse to have children; they just want to delay 
having children. Are there any consumer alternatives which have different attractiveness for 
different ethnic and religious groups? May be modern consumer market also can create 
alternatives which in long-term perspective increase the desire of parents to have more 
children? For-example, the purchase of personal car can negatively influence the desire to 
have children, but in long-term period such purchase stimulates a couple to have a child. 
Becker doesn‟t give answers for these questions. Since its first formulation the demand theory 
met many criticisms.  
As a result of various discussions, new theory was born with an emphasis on cultural 
determinant of fertility decline – diffusion theory. It is agreed that Beverage was first who 
formulated the idea of innovation in connection with fertility transition; he considered it in the 
same way as technology spreading.  
Influential Princeton European Fertility project could not demonstrate clear 
relationship between fertility transition and socio-economic modernization.  It has shown the 
fact that the same fertility variations happen often in different cultures, and economic 
development is not the necessary condition for fertility transition (Coale 1973).  
Studies displayed that the similar thing for all areas with decline in fertility was the 
rapid speed of secularization (Lesthaeghe 1977). Therefore, researches came to the conclusion 
that economic development and fertility decline is always accompanied by secularization. But 
they stressed that secularization could happen without industrialization. Some authors use the 
context of westernization to describe the secularization and fertility link.  Basically, 
secularization is spreading in society from the most influential groups to less influential in 
terms of access to information (Weeks 2008). 
Education allows people to receive access to information; therefore, the speed of 
ideas‟ exchange increases rapidly. Modernization motivate people to be more educated, 
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eliminates gender disproportions in education attainment. Mass education change the way 
ideas move in society (Caldwell 1982). But this is not the major point; more important is that 
society should be prepared to accept the new idea because there are always more traditional 
and more modern people. More traditional people resist new ideas, more modern drive them. 
The degree of power which has such groups determines the scope of fertility decline.  
Relevant studies suggest that the areas which have similar culture are more likely to 
experience the same scenarios of fertility decline (Watkins 1991).  Language is very 
important in this context because to spread the idea successfully people need an effective tool. 
Different language, religion and as a result the life style create many difficulties for the ideas 
sharing, thus, the common fertility decline is less possible. 
Lesthaeghe and partners (1973) have investigated that European regions with weak 
characteristics of religious participation have higher divorce rates; non-marital fertility, share 
of cohabitations and abortions. They found that cultural differences that are established earlier 
have consistent effects on fertility behavior even when economic conditions change.  
Going to conclusion, I have to look at the views of the main theorists on the  
importance of new technological event affected women‟ behavior during that time most of all 
which is the oral contraceptive use in developed countries and contraceptive introduction in 
developing. Both theories emphasized the role of pills in developed countries. Many authors 
pointed out that the decline of fertility in the 50s-60s started before the pills, but the tempo of 
decline was much more pronounced due to its use. Here the distinction between developed 
and developing countries is extremely important. Some scientists have claimed that 
“additional effect of contraceptive availability is quantitatively small” in developing 
countries. In contrast others have argued, contraception and family planning programs are in 
the center of fertility decline factors (Caldwell 2001, p. 99). In this respect Russia is hard 
society for classification. There was one Russia, with developed medicine, high levels of 
women independence, advanced industry, secular ideologies and it could be classified as a 
developed society. However, there was another Russia, with strong agrarian block, influential 
traditions, and low living standards. And it could be defined as a developing society.  Keeping 
in mind those considerations to address them later, I turn to the summary of this section. 
To some extent cultural and micro-economic perspectives are competitive, 
nonetheless, they are complete each other. Modernization cannot operate in the absence of 
appropriate cultural conditions. Surely, they are created by economic development, but in the 
same time the scope and speed of modernization depends on traditions existed in particular 
society long time ago. 
 
3.3. The Easterlin-Crimmins model 
 
Easterlin considered demand model (Columbia-Chicago) as incomplete. He suggested 
that such “supply” variables as nutrition, infant mortality should be endogenous. Even more, 
he believed Chicago‟s model is not good enough in “demand” variables too. Donaldson 
(1991, p. 78) gives the following interpretation of Easterlin‟s reflection: “In accessing the 
Chicago-Columbia analysis, Easterlin accepts the idea  that relative prices will influence 
fertility to a limited degree. But he emphasized the importance of the living standard idea, 
which has much broader acceptance and precedence. His approach is to introduce a simplified 
taste function, one that is testable and related to experienced living standards”. 
Richard Easterlin and Eileen Crimmins (1985, p. 4). in the book “The Fertility 
Revolution” write that economic and social modernizations in most cases are observed 
together with the fertility transformation from high levels to low, however, high variability 
exists between countries. They test the theory of fertility decline causes starting from the 
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definition of the link modernization-fertility. In fact, their definition is quite in line with other 
theories – modernization causes the fertility and mortality reduction, population re-
concentration and re-distribution, as well as “openness to new experience, increased 
independence from parental authority, the ambition for oneself and for one‟s children”. They 
present the idea that the most important change in fertility behavior is the change in “fertility 
and fertility control” when the decision to have or not to have children is transferred from 
social groups to couples (Easterlin & Crimmins 1985, p. 4). They select core factors through 
which fertility is influenced by modernization – “advances in public health, schooling, 
urbanization, introduction to new goods and family planning programs” (Easterlin & 
Crimmins 1985, p. 11). 
Basically, Easterlin and Crimmins integrate economic and cultural factors which affect 
fertility decision into supply-demand model. They combine together cross-sectional and 
longitudinal  data, explaining  contraceptive  use  in several developing countries. According 
to their scheme,  three  determinants  of fertility decline are necessary to consider:  the  
demand  for  children, the  natural  supply  of  children  and  the  cost  of fertility  regulation.  
These factors determine the use of contraceptives and, therefore, fertility.   
This  theoretical  framework  involves consideration of cultural factors which stand 
behind the transition. The model introduces four constraints for utility function: financial 
constraint expressed in time costs, technological upgrade of particular couple, births and 
deaths (which are constrained by nutrition, health, some social variables). As societies 
become more modern and the quality of nutrition and health rise, natural fertility increases. In 
contrast, desired fertility goes down because of changes in “tastes”. Family begins to apply 
more advanced fertility control methods. If control is not implemented, fertility is “supply-
determined”, in presence of control fertility is “demand-determined” (Donaldson 1991, p. 82). 
More specifically, the demand for children depends on the following factors: 
household income, costs and benefits of children, costs of mother‟s time. The important thing 
is not the costs and benefits of children itself, but its relative value in relation to alternative 
goods. A higher demand for consumption of other goods lowers the demand for children, as 
in Becker‟s thoughts (Easterlin & Crimmins 1985).  
Economic development affects infant mortality rates substantially, thus, increasing the 
supply of children. At the same time modernization allows families starting control of natural 
children‟s supply, natural fertility. Supply of children becomes regulated by individual 
decisions based on family income, women status and perspectives. Easterlin and Crimmins 
(1985, p. 18) focus on “costs of fertility regulation”. Important term they use is “conscious 
effort to limit fertility” which is opposite to natural fertility. Modernization affects the micro-
decisions by accessibility of family planning services and techniques. Costs depend on the 
attitudes of society as well as it‟s the most influential groups (avant-garde or religious gurus) 
towards fertility control, and the availability of information and techniques.  
Finally, the decision to have children is “a balance between supply and demand” and 
it‟s a response to a threat of fertility to social well-being and established order (Easterlin & 
Crimmins 1985, p. 9). Therefore, according to Easterlin and Crimmins macro-fertility in 
modern society is determined by the system of family micro-solutions based on couple‟s 
economic and cultural position in particular society. It seems to be easy, but there are a lot of 
hidden elements and connections. By their book “The Fertility Revolution” they attempt to 
answer on the following questions: “Does the spreading deliberate control reflect motivation, 
declining regulation costs or both? If motivation is growing is it because of decreasing 
demand, growing supply, or both? What is the role of policy?” (Easterlin & Crimmins 1985, 
p.12).  
Authors established theoretical model which received a lot of attention both theoretical 
and empirical and it was considered as the most powerful in its field. However, research on 
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fertility decline has recently banned the  assumption of fertility control decided by a gender-
neutral unit called “couple” or “parents”, and looked at the differing interests of husbands and 
wives and their bargaining power in fertility decisions (Weeks 2008). 
Some researches consider the Easterlin-Crimmins model more dynamically. For-
example, demand for children is “not only the function of current economic situation but also 
future”. Changes in labor market conditions, such as higher unemployment, lower job 
security, create uncertainties about present and future earnings. On the one hand, 
industrialization created uncertainties and, thus, decrease demand for children (Hondroyiannis 
2009, p. 34). But on the other hand, industrialization uncertainties can increase demand – 
parents start to invest more in children to secure their unstable future. 
 Generally, Easterlin and Crimmins conclusions meet a lot of criticism. Next 
generation of researchers suggested the model had big field for improvement.  Some 
scientists have argued, the major model‟s weak field is that it doesn‟t stress properly  the  
difficulties  of measuring  regulation costs. Regulation  costs  are primarily  defined as the  
number  of methods  of birth  control  known  to couples surveyed.  As Crafts (1987, p. 680) 
stresses, the  problem  with  this  measure  is that  it is  highly  likely  reflect motivation  
rather  than  simply  be “an  influence conditioning  the  adoption  of  birth  control  given”. 
 Despite having some fields for improvement, Easterlin-Crimmins model helps to show 
the general scenarios of how modernization affects fertility process.  
I go away from the suggestions how to improve Easterlin and Crimmins model and 
apply it in its pure form for my empirical analysis. My interest here lies in the consideration 
of regional fertility patterns in Russia and implementation of Easterlin-Crimmins model to the 
data available in historical records. I suppose the model is quite relevant for understanding the 
transitional fertility regime in Russia and the big step toward total fertility control. The task is 
to investigate to what extent the Easterlin-Crimmins approach is appropriate for describing 
fertility in transitional and post-transitional period affected by substantial modern shifts. 
Additionally, the Easterlin Relative Cohort size Hypothesis is important for my 
analysis because Russia during selected years experienced serious disproportions in different 
cohort sizes due to Second World War results. This hypothesis is based on assumption that 
fertility decline doesn‟t depend on absolute levels of economic development but on relative 
(Easterlin 1980). Easterlin argues that standards of living which people have in their 
childhood determine the evaluations of their chances as adult. Thus, if people can improve 
income comparing with late childhood level, there is greater probability that they will have 
more children. Here the role of young cohort in the population is important. If the share of 
young people in population is large, the demand for children goes down – as a result of 
population pressure experienced by their young parents. In other words, the supply and 
demand motivates people to change their child-bearing patterns. Relative earnings depend on 
generation structure of particular society which in turn influences the size of demand and 
supply. He compares unemployment rates and relative earnings for generations of the 50s and 
the 70s concluding that the “weight of numbers” sharply affects the relative unemployment as 
well as the relative earning disadvantages of the young. These changes in younger‟s men‟s 
relative earnings and unemployment rates reflect shifts in supply of youngs versus olds 
(Easterlin 1980, p. 25). 
The quality of entry-level jobs matters. Theoretically, if young starts with the entry-
positions with less quality he will probably delay having children. Moreover, the speed of 
moving up at the career ladder will be slower in the case of surplus generation. For women 
the effect of generation size is even stronger (Easterlin 1980). 
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3. 4. Previous research 
 
This work is not a commonly accepted attempt to use econometric techniques for 
understanding fertility processes in Soviet Russia. Regional approach in Russian historical 
demography is not widespread and almost all available studies are conducted on country 
level. 
I use regional data because Russia includes too many cultural and economic groups 
and regional approach is the most useful when fertility is studied to avoid heteroscedasticity. 
The research is closely connected with the mix of available panel and cross-sectional studies 
of European fertility. Studies of Russian fertility mostly use descriptive approach for the 
analysis. The main empirical works I have selected for the goals of current analysis are briefly 
described below. 
George Hondroyiannis (2009) examined the determinants of fertility, using panel data 
for 27 European countries. He employed panel co-integration to estimate fertility as function 
of demographic and economic variables. He showed that low fertility in most industrialized 
countries in Europe is due to low infant mortality rates, high female employment, low 
nuptiality rate, and high opportunity cost of having children. The empirical  results confirm 
statement that that both measures of economic uncertainty he has used have “a signiﬁcant 
negative impact on fertility implying that labor market insecurities might be a signiﬁcant 
factor affecting fertility decisions” (Hondroyiannis 2009, p. 33). For me it can be very 
important finding because soviet socio-economic reality was quite different from the 
capitalistic with its high level of labor market insecurities.  
Comparative analysis of Switzerland made by Praz (2009) showed striking differences 
in norms of childbearing in different religious groups. In the protestant canton, men were 
especially targeted and strongly motivated to limit their offspring in order to correspond with 
“a new model of the good husband and father”. In the Catholic canton the religious norms 
supported the husband's rights “to trust Providence to bring up many children, thus sustaining 
high levels of fertility” (Praz 2009, p. 104). This can be helpful in defining right conclusions 
about ethnic differences in fertility. 
Although, Morrison (2009, p. 115) in his article uses American data, he shows that 
“the stronger the presence of conservative churches within a county, the more traditional the 
fertility patterns”. 
Barber (2009) in the study «Explaining Cross-National Differences in Fertility: A 
Comparative Approach to the Demographic Shift» using a sample of 45 countries broken out 
by urban and rural location,  showed that demographic shift (TFR < 2.6) occurred when infant 
mortality fell below 33  per thousand, and when GDP per capita rose above US $20,508. He 
suggests that declining fertility in modern societies constitutes an adaptive response to 
ecological conditions and is largely predictable from them. These results indicate that 
“reduced fertility is an adaptive response to ecological and social circumstances suggesting 
that human adaptations relevant to family size are affected by modern conditions”. The sex 
ratio is shown as a positive predictor of fertility, implying that where there is a good supply of 
men; women have higher fertility. We should take into consideration that supply of men was 
relatively low during selected period in Russia and this also affected fertility rates. Moreover, 
ecological quality of environment was also getting worse that time due to modernization. 
Luis (2009) in his cross-country analysis found that with coefficients of around 
−0.300, a one-standard-deviation increase in education is associated with a decline in TFRs of 
0.87. Luis has found that the overall effect of mortality rates on gross fertility is large and 
positive. But that the overall effect on net fertility is close to zero. His main results are that 
mortality changes have a large impact on fertility reductions and explain  a big part of fertility 
28 
 
change. This result is obtained controlling for alternative explanatory factors of fertility, 
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed-effects, time-dummies, and “using the GMM methodology of Arellano 
and Bond(1991) to control for endogeneity”. Both gross and net fertility are affected by 
mortality (Luis 2009, p. 113). Unfortunately, we can not operate by educational statistics at 
municipality level to apply this results, but we should take it into consideration. 
Dribe (2008) in the paper “Demand and supply factors in the fertility transition: a 
county-level analysis of age-speciﬁc marital fertility in Sweden, 1880–1930” studies the 
importance of demand and supply factors in the Swedish fertility transition using county-level 
data and panel regressions. He connects fertility decline with broad socioeconomic changes 
taking place in the late nineteenth  and early twentieth centuries, following the transition from 
an agriculturally based economy to an industrial one. This transition involved sustained 
mortality decline, increasing levels of urbanization, expansion of education and increased 
female labor market.  These changes “had a large impact on the demand and supply of 
children,  contributing to wide spread fertility control and reduced family size” (Dribe 2008, 
p. 89). 
Analysis of Russian cohort fertility conducted by Scherbov and van Vianen (1999) 
allowed to conclude that the long-term trends in demographic behavior developed in almost 
complete independence from major socio-economic events.  None of the observed economic 
crises in Russia which took place in 1940-1970 “had succeeded in exerting a decisive 
influence on the course of the demographic transition”  (Zakharov & Ivanova 1996, pp. 38-
39). His results highlight that political events often had profound short-term effects. The 
catastrophic events of the Second World War, the problems of Reconstruction and the policy 
measures around 1981 were distinguishable in the period figures. Such conclusion can be 
quite helpful in interpreting the results. 
Zakharov (2008) in his work «Russia: from the first to second demographic transition» 
described qualitative and quantitative characteristics of fertility in the 60s and the 70s in 
Russia. He emphasized the role of abortions in Russian fertility behavior and low age at first 
marriage as the most distinguishing Russian fertility features for that time. 
Vishnevsky and Volkov (1983) made conclusions about ethnic differences in USSR‟s 
fertility. They showed that ethnic differences were very important in the 60s and that this 
phenomenon became weaker in the 70s but somehow it influenced fertility. Unfortunately, 
they just focused on ethnicities which represented 15 soviet republics. Ethnicities inside 
Russia such as tatarts, chuvashi, mordava and others were not taken into considerations and 
this remained as an open field for contemporary studies. 
All these findings move my research to better understanding of existing relationship 
between fertility and modernization, as well as to more exact description of fertility responses 
to modernization. 
 
3.5. Variables 
  
I link Easterlin-Crimmins model with the data available for two regions below. F. Ajus 
(2009) in his analyses of Transilvania modernization presents quite structural application of 
the theory to regional data. Based on such experience I apply theoretical model described 
earlier to the regional data.  
Supply modeling. 
Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) in their model consider infant mortality as the main 
variable which determines the supply of children. Child and infant mortality decreased 
substantially during considered period in both regions. Therefore, fewer births were required 
than before to achieve the same number of surviving children. I showed earlier that wide net 
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of children‟s health centers were built throughout the country. And since the 60s every 
settlement with population more than 10 thousand people had specialized doctor in pediatrics. 
Thus, the decrease in CBR as a response to decreased IMR was logic. Variable used in my 
model is infant mortality on municipality level. I expect that infant mortality and gross 
fertility are positively related. Lower infant mortality is expected to increase supply in 
Easterlin‟s model and depress fertility.  
Demand modeling. 
Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) consider women labor participation rate as the main 
indicator of opportunity costs in society and the measure of demand for children. However, 
official statistics available for selected regions makes impossible the use of women labor 
participation rate in the analysis. What I have to put in the regression is the share of 
industrial workers in the total population. This share has been increasing in both regions 
during 1958-1978. There are signs to expect finding negative correlation between the crude 
birth rate and the share of industrial workers. 
Costs of regulation. 
The nature of the link existed between net migration and crude birth rate is difficult. 
But I decided to include net migration rate as an indicator of costs of regulation. The reason 
is that the type of migration pattern in particular region somehow reflects the availability of 
regulation techniques known there. If the municipality is rural, locates very far from the big 
cities and has negative net migration – we can believe that the diffusion of regulation tools is 
difficult there. It‟s quite weak assumption; however, I‟m motivated to test it. 
The second variable I use to assess the costs of regulation is the dummy Region. I 
collect the data for two regions - Nizhny Novgorod with the majority of Russian orthodox 
people (more modernized) and Chuvash Region with the majority of Chuvash Muslims (more 
traditional). Hypothesis can be formulated as that municipality located in Nizhny Novgorod 
Region associated with lower fertility holding other parameters fixed. 
This measure is an indirect measure of religion strength in particular region as well. It 
can shed some light on the question – has the Muslim region been more affected by 
modernization than Orthodox in time of strong state secularization? 
Undoubtedly, costs of fertility regulation correlate with cultural differences in selected 
regions. Researchers suggested that Muslim population in Russia experienced softer decline 
in fertility because of strong male influence. Monks were opened almost in every village 
during soviet time while orthodox churches were ruined (Vishnevsky & Volkov 1983). There 
are a plenty of studies that approved that in Muslim regions fertility norms were kept stronger 
than in Orthodox areas: marriage was regarded as a sacred institution in greater extent, with 
the primary goal giving birth to children, and abortion was condemned (Weeks 2008).  
Abortions were widely spread in Russia. However, religion is very influential thing if it 
concerns abortions. The Chuvash people were more open the for religious norms than people 
in the more modern Nizhny Novgorod Region. Thus, variable which I use to reflect 
differences in fertility control methods known for population is dummy «Region» and “net 
migration rate”.  
Summarizing, I have to state that the variables chosen are not the best choice variables 
for the Esterlin-Crimmin‟s model testing. As I have highlighted earlier, history limits me in 
part of data availability. Nonetheless, the application of the model and the data presented can 
help to answer on the main research question of this study. 
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3.6. Summary of hypothesis 
 
Easterlin and Crimmins framework seems to be quite powerful in explaining fertility 
in selected Russian regions. Applying theories and previous research described above, I 
expect to find substantial regional differences in crude birth rate depending on modernization 
level.  
The main hypothesis is that Nizhny Novgorod Region negatively associated with 
crude birth rate, holding other parameters fixed. This is mainly due to economic factors, 
which affected demand and supply of surviving children. However, culture also plays an 
important role in determining the cost of fertility regulation. Muslim religion in Chuvash 
Republic and low secularization rate are expected to be positively correlated with fertility, due 
to higher costs of fertility regulation. For that purpose, I use reference dummy “Nizhny 
Novgorod” which helps to capture qualitative characteristics of the model. 
Secondly, the relationship between infant mortality and fertility is expected to be 
positive holding other parameters fixed. 
Thirdly, it can be assumed that the share of industrial workers and gross fertility are 
negatively related to each other. Higher industrial share depresses fertility, as demand for 
children goes down.  
Next, higher net migration rate is expected to coincide with lower fertility. Negative  
effect of net migration on fertility has quite obvious nature – municipality which attracts a lot 
of migrants is developed in terms of industry, thus, people experience urban style of fertility 
behavior there.   
Two independent variables I selected (share of industrial workers and net migration 
rate) is supposed to suffer from mutual correlation and cause multicollinearity problem. 
Further, I inspect this particular problem in detail. 
Additionally, I use time dummies to catch time variations of the relationship between 
fertility and modernization parameters. The whole period was divided by four sub-periods 
(groups) and 1958-1963 group was omitted as a reference group. This is in line with 5-year 
economic planning and development of USSR economy. I expect to obtain negative signs for 
all dummies and the most negative magnitude for the 70s periods.  
The model is estimated under fixed-effect where the intercept term vary over the 
individuals and units (because the sample is not random draw from some population, number 
of units is relatively small) and random effect assumption (Verbeek 2004). I expect to find 
significant differences within municipalities. Despite command system of management 
existed during that time in Soviet Russia, the possibly significant differences in human 
resources and historical background of every municipality should be taken into account. 
I expect to find the evidence of stronger fertility response to modernization in case of 
Nizhny Novgorod Region. My primary expectation is that both scenarios have a lot of 
common or even they are almost the same, moving along the same trajectory but on different 
levels, despite different levels of socio-economic development existed in those regions. Figure 
14 reflects three possible scenarios of fertility responses to modernization for two regions. 
The first possible scenario is when both regions show increasing response to modernization, 
the same scope and the gap in-between for 1958 and 1978 in favor of less traditional region.  
The second one presents the case when two regions don‟t demonstrate any reaction to modern 
impact at all (the least possible scenario). And the third scheme displays the situation of much 
stronger reaction for one region (less traditional), and lower for another (more traditional). 
Definitely, such graphic is the simplest way of focusing and concluding. Nonetheless, it can 
shed the light on the fundamental regional relationships and differences. Somebody may 
assume that also the fourth scenario can exist – when one region shows increasing response 
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and another one – decreasing. But theories which I have listed as well as relevant socio-
economic background direct me to select only three scenarios presented below.  
I believe that two analyzed regions were developing according with the first scenario 
(a). My goal is to test this assumption using the data available. 
 
Figure 14. Three possible scenarios of regional fertility response to modernization. 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                                (b)                                                           (c) 
Note. The vertical axe displays the strength of response, the horizontal axe reflects years. 
4. Data  
 
4.1. Data and sources 
 
The process of data collection met some obstacles. The main is the lack of the data for 
some municipalities. Therefore, I had to refuse from using TFR as a measure of fertility and 
to turn to CBR which didn‟t require age structure information. Two concepts of fertility are 
usually used in literature: gross and net fertility. Gross fertility relates to the number of births 
per person in the population, net fertility relates to the number of surviving children per 
person (Weeks, 2008). An attempt to find data for total fertility rate calculation in selected 
municipalities was made. However, it was not successful. There is not enough information on 
the municipality‟s level for that time, many municipalities miss such information. CBR will 
be used, although I listed several difficulties connected with CBR earlier. 
Data sources are not homogeneous. For Nizhny Novgorod Region data comes from 
Regional state archive. Data for Chuvash Republic were received from Regional Statistical 
service. Information for 1958-1962 was found in Regional passports
3
 which were issued 
every year. For that time hand data recording was used. 1963-1978 data came from annual 
statistical handbooks which were edited by Government and spread mainly through the 
system of different governmental structures. This information is printed and it‟s less 
systematic than the Passports. The 70s statistics was presented in archives in closer 
connection with socialism propaganda and the importance of socialistic labor results than the 
60s statistics.  
Finally, I collected data for 47 municipalities represented two Russian regions. Nizhny 
Novgorod Region where the majority of orthodox Russians live has 26 municipalities in the 
dataset. Chuvash Republic Region with the majority of Chuvash people has 21 municipalities 
in the sample (observations). Time important for me is 1958-1978 (21 years).  
One important note is that I don‟t collect the data for two capital municipalities within 
these regions to avoid heteroscedasticity. The municipality with regional capital city is out of 
                                                          
3
 See appendix 9.1. 
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my focus because it has completely different set of characteristics which can create many 
outliers in my dataset.  
Four population parameters were received for each municipality – crude birth rate, 
infant mortality rate, share of industrial workers in population, net migration rate. Annual data 
for infant mortality, crude birth rate, net migration rate calculation were collected by 
statistical service every year from the system of soviet ZAGS. The Zags were located in every 
municipality and individuals had to register all live events there. Therefore, it offers quite 
reliable figures. Population quantity was calculated by civil servants on the basis of 
population censuses. In that case the possibility of bias is higher. Data were processed using 
STATA. 
Finally, the data were organized as a panel of 47 municipalities (observations) for 21 
years. 
 
4.3. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Table below presents the main summary statistics. Mean crude birth rate for selected 
period is 18.07 children per 1000 population (compare with 12.4 in 2009), mean infant 
mortality rate equals to 30,3 children per 1000 and mean for industrial share variable is 0,049 
or 5% from total population.  
 
Table 5. Summary statistics.  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Cbr 18.70952 16.8 7.392064 8.5 47 
Imr 30.30598 27 15.02761 4 104 
Indshare .0497952 0.0284 .0526313 .0036 .3911 
Netmigr rate -11.73698 -8.55 23.88479 -375.365    48.57143 
 
Figure 15 presented below supports previous considerations in the background section. 
CBR has been decreasing gradually in 1958-1978 from 26.81 in 1958 to 14.73 per population 
thousand in 1978 .   
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Figure 15. CBR (both regions). 
 
 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, Friday, January 28, 2011; 5:46:53 PM. 
 
As it‟s displayed at the graph, the most rapid decline in the crude fertility happens in 
the decade of the 60s, the crude birth rate has fallen at more than 10 children per women. The 
70s are also the years of decline, but the scope is much smoother there. How does it correlate 
with the world dynamics? In fact, crude birth rate in these two regions was even lower than in 
the most industrialized country for that time – USA. The year of 1968 was marked in the US 
fertility history as a major “break-through” as the birth rate reached the lowest level in 
American history 17.5 children per population thousand  (Easterlin 1980, p. 37). From this 
point of view, I suppose it is important to inspect the picture of CBR decline separately for 
two regions. 
The Figure 16 highlights clearly the difference in regional fertility development. 
However, not surprisingly for me, the difference is not radical. The regions start their way 
from two different levels of CBR, but move in the same direction with the same scope and 
have approximately the same final destination, though, on different levels. Nizhny Novgorod 
gross fertility  falls from 26.8 in 1958 to 13.2 in 1978 while Chuvash from 30.41 to 16.9 
respectively. The gap between regions is slightly decreasing from 3.61 in 1958 to 3.51 in 
1978 per thousand population.  
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Figure 16. CBR (Regional difference). 
 
 
 
Both regions demonstrate the slight increase in CBR in the period between 1962 and 
1966. Explanation can lay both in the field of better economic conditions and generation size 
effect. However, I suppose to reject the latter hypothesis because the relevant cohort analysis 
shows that cohorts born in the 1940-1945 (potential parents for the 1962-1966) have been 
relatively small (Zakharov 2008). 
Further, I‟m motivated to present the picture of infant mortality in these two regions. 
Firstly, the statistics for both regions is reflected in Figure 17. Infant mortality rate was 
decreasing throughout the whole period of 1958-1978. Obviously, the dynamic of infant 
mortality decline is far from being close to the patterns of Western and Northern Europe, 
USA; the significant delay in reduction has existed. Infant mortality declined sharply from 
49.85 to 24.57 in twenty years of 1958-1978 - almost twice reduction. This fact approves the 
thesis that modernization in Soviet Russia can be described as extremely rapid and affected 
IMR substantially.  
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Figure 17. IMR (total for two regions). 
  
 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, Friday, January 28, 2011; 6:42:02 PM. 
 
Figure 18 supports my initial assumption that Nizhny Novgorod and Chuvash 
Republic have different levels of infant mortality, one is more modern and another is more 
traditional. Unexpectedly, the regional difference in infant mortality is striking – almost 20 
children per 1000 for 1958 and almost 10 children for 1978. The significant reduction in IMR 
gap between the regions happens, though the equal position has not been reached. 
 
Figure 18. IMR (regions). 
 
Chuvash Republic has the highest level of infant mortality – there are several cells in 
the dataset with three digits of infant mortality for Chuvash Republic. It reflects somehow the 
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overall portrait of the region - agrarian orientation and more traditional life with the lack of 
appropriate medicine support. 
Figure 19 reflecting net migration in both regions shows radical differences in the 
nature of migration processes. The N. Novgorod‟s migration line can be divided in two 
periods – negative net migration gap (decline and further recovering) somewhere around 
1964; then stable positive net migration with minimum fluctuations and smoother trend‟s 
scope. Chuvashian migration is always negative and significantly negatively higher than 
another pattern.  
Such different characteristics received by ocular inspection support initial assumption 
that two regions have completely different histories of urbanization. I have to remind - two 
big cities (regional capitals) with high population concentration are excluded from my 
analysis to avoid heteroscedasticity. Thus, I operate only with municipalities having 
homogeneous (relatively) population processes.  
 
Figure 19. Net migration. 
 
 
 
The next important clue for further analysis is the evolution of industrial share in time 
and space. Definitely, Nizhny Novgorod Region experienced much stronger industrialization 
than the other Region. The industrial share of total population grow from 4,7 in 1958 to 6,82 
in 1978. This is not revolutionary development, because we don‟t take into account the main 
capital city. But even these figures demonstrate quite obviously that as in case of other 
variables Nizhny Novgorod shows more modern characteristics. In addition, quite important 
finding is that the increase in industrial share is gradual in case of Nizhny Novgorod while 
Chuvashian data are more fluctuating around mean. I see two picks of industrial share 
increase – one is around 1961 and another one is around 1972. Is this a mistake in data 
recording? I believe it is not. Probably, it is connected with the nature of region‟s economy, 
more traditional and, thus, not stable. Perhaps, this radical increase of industrial workers in 
total population is the result of some temporary massive construction projects according with 
Land cut off, 
agrarian reforms 
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soviet plans involved the delivery of low-skills workers from rural areas which returned 
finally to agrarian labor-force. 
 
Figure 20. Share of industrial workers in total population. 
 
 
 
 
To sum up, as primary statistics shows, Nizhny Novgorod was more modern in terms 
of development outcomes. However, differences are not extreme. The common boarder of 
these regions means that these areas have a lot of similar features and similar processes have 
gone there.  Nonetheless, even ocular inspection supports my initial assumption and the main 
line of this study about substantial regional differences in fertility outcomes between two 
regions. Following frequency table illustrates quite good previous theoretical discussion 
concerning regional differences in fertility. Districts with infant mortality rates and crude birth 
rates less than average are mostly districts belonging to more modern Nizhny Novgorod 
Region. 
  
Table 6. Frequencies for regions with below average values, %.  
Region/Frequency IMR CBR NMR 
 
Nizhny Novgorod 
Region 
73.92 69.31 56.29 
Chuvash Region 26.08 30.69 43.71 
Total 100.00 100.00 100 
 
Thus, the choice of those particular regions for analysis was not wrong. I have two 
different regions for comparison – modern and agrarian, and the description statistics reflects 
this differences. 
Additionally, I present the correlation matrix of variables available. As table 7 
illustrates, the highest correlation is observed in case of cbr and imr, the lowest between cbr 
and industrial share. The signs of correlations are in line with my theoretical expectations – 
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positive in case of infant mortality rate and negative for two other variables. Correlation 
between net migration and industrial share is lower than I  expected to get and this is 
important issue for further conclusion.  
 
Table 7. Correlation table.  
Variable CBR Indshare IMR NMR 
 
CBR 1.00    
Indshare -0.14 1.00   
Imr 0.62 -0.12 1.00  
NMR -0.25 0.19 -0.21 1.00 
 
One of the major concerns is the danger of spurious regression when the data are non-
stationary. I test for the non-stationarity of the variables in the model with two different tests - 
the  Levin-Lin-Chu (2002)  and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) unit root tests for panel data 
(Verbeek, 2004). The former test employs a common AR structure for all series, while the 
latter allow for different AR coefficients in each series. The results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Testing for unit-root. 
Method Indshare 
(trend) 
Imr 
(trend) 
NMR 
(trend) 
CBR 
(trend) 
Levin-Lin-
Chu statistics 
-4.3146*        
(0.0000) 
-6.4067*       
(0.0000) 
-5.6519*        
(0.0000) 
-4.0541*       
(0.0000) 
Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
statistics 
-12.2156*        
(0.0000) 
-9.8757*        
(0.0000) 
-9.8294*        
(0.0000) 
-2.0018        
(0.0227)** 
Note: Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends. Automatic selection of lags 
based on SIC: 0 to 2 maximum lags. * Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% signiﬁcance level,  ** at 
5% significance level. 
 
I test null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. Both tests indicate that the 
null hypothesis should be rejected, thus, the series don‟t contain unit roots. All the variables 
are stationary and don‟t require differencing.  
Next, I describe the model to apply the data. 
 
 
5. Methods 
5.1. Statistical model 
 
I obtain model with crude fertility rate as dependent variable and such independent 
variables as - infant mortality rate, share of industrial workers in municipality, region 
(ethnicity) dummies, net migration rate, 5-year time dummies. 
It is estimated by two estimators: fixed-effects panel estimator (FE),  random effect 
estimator (RE). I consider both cases in details below. 
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Fixed effect estimator means that the effects of a change in independent variables are 
the same for all municipalities and all periods. But that the average level for one municipality  
may be different from that for another municipality. The intercept in this case captures the 
effects of those variables that are “peculiar to the i-municipality and that are constant over 
time”. In the standard case, ε is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over 
municipalities and time, with mean zero and constant variance i.e. (Verbeek 2004, p. 342). 
 
Essentially, the ﬁxed-effects model concentrates on differences „within‟ individuals. It 
is explaining to what extent yit differs from y average, and does not explain why yi  is different 
from yj. 
Random-effect approach assumes that the intercepts of the municipalities are different 
but “that they can be treated as drawings from a distribution with mean µ and variance 
σ2”.These drawings  are independent of the explanatory variables in xit. The individual effects 
are treated as random (Verbeek 2004, p. 342), i.e. 
(1) 
 
The random effects (EGLS) estimator combines the information from the between and 
within dimensions in an efficient way.  
An important reason why the two estimators would be different is the existence of 
“correlation between independent variables and intercept term” (Verbeek 2004, p. 352).  
In this case I deal with limited number of observations and my sample is not random. 
Thus, I may expect that fixed-effect estimator will be more appropriate. However, 
municipalities are quite homogenous, because they locate in neighboring regions. The system 
of public administration was universal and the same for all municipalities for that time. 
Further, the Hausman method to test if the difference between two estimators is significant 
will be applied. 
   
5.2. Estimation procedure 
 
I estimated the model by two estimators – fixed-effect and random effect.  
Hausman test to inspect which estimator is more consistent was implemented. The 
Hausman test checks whether the ﬁxed effects and random effects estimator are signiﬁcantly 
different. In my case test results shows that both estimators are consistent (test statistics 
2.89,p>Chisq=0.8118). Earlier, I have noted that random effect estimator is more complex 
than fixed effect estimator, thus, I expect to base my further conclusions on it. 
Next, the model is tested for the assumptions of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes the 
results to be less eﬃcient, therefore, there is a need for identifying serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model. I perform Woolbdridge
4
 test to check for 
possible autocorrelation. The test results show that there is no serial autocorrelation in the 
dataset (F (1, 46) = 27.148, Prob > F = 0.0000) (Verbeek 2004). 
Heteroscedasticity issue is quite important for panels. The standard error component in 
panel data model employs that the disturbances have homoskedastic variances. These may be 
“restrictive assumptions” for a lot of panels. For example, the cross-sectional units may be 
varying in size and as a result may suffer from heteroskedasticity. LR test was implemented to 
                                                          
4
 See Drukker, D. (2003). Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-data models. The Stata Journal 3, Number 
2, pp.168-177. 
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test for heteroscedasticity. I have run regressions for two nested models - restricted and 
unrestricted, and computed test statistics which is twice the difference in these log-likelihoods 
(LR chi2(46) = 49.27, Prob > chi2 = 0.3438). The null hypothesis for this test is 
homoskedasticity. I don‟t reject the null, thus, there is no evidence to believe that the standard 
errors suffer from heteroscedasticity (Verbeek 2004). 
Therefore, the model estimated by random-effect estimator, can be accepted. 
According to regression output, almost all coefficients are statistically significant even at 1% 
level except coefficient for net migration. Standard errors are relatively small. Random-effect 
estimation produces the results which are quite in line with my initial expectations. These 
results indicate a reasonably high overall R
2
 of 0,52 and fairly high t-ratios for all significant 
coefﬁcients. 
6. Results and discussion 
 
6.1. Model results 
 
The results of coefficients‟ evaluation are presented in Table 9 (standard errors in 
parentheses). 
 
Table 9. Panel regression random and fixed effects estimates of crude birth rate 
(N=987). 
Dependent variable:cbr 
Variable 
Fixed-
effect 
p-values Random-effect p-values 
Constant 22.11206   
(.5007076) 
0.000* 25.07776   
(.8649821) 
0.000* 
Imr .087995    
(.010313) 
0.000* .0897079   
(.0102087) 
0.000* 
NMR .0041036   
(.0056526) 
0.468 .0035852   
(.0055882) 
0.521 
Indshare 19.613   
(4.283042) 
0.000* 18.04845   
(4.090476) 
0.000* 
NN -  -5.448435   
(.9269777) 
0.000* 
Year2 
(1963-1968) 
-7.708082   
(.3184736) 
0.000* -7.669867    
(.317397) 
0.000* 
Year3 
(1968-1973) 
-10.90194   
(.3447882) 
0.000* -10.85209   
(.3432576) 
0.000* 
Year4 
(1973-1978) 
-10.45552    
(.341479) 
0.000* -10.42102   
.3403106 
0.000* 
R
2
 within 0.7361  0.7360  
R
2
 between 0.0933  0.5104  
R
2
 overall 0.5213  0.6609  
Note. the dependent variable is crude birth rate.  * Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% 
signiﬁcance level,  ** at 5% significance level, *** at 10% level. 
 
 
The overall R
2 
equals to 0,66 suggesting that the model explains 66% variation of 
crude birth rate. It‟s rather good result, however, R2 doesn‟t allow me to tell more about the 
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quality of the model. Next, I discuss the results of the main coefficients evaluation following 
by dummies results. 
As it is evident from the Table 9, the relationship between crude birth rate and infant 
mortality rate, net migration rate, the share of industrial population is positive. 
The effect of child mortality on crude birth rate is positive and statistically signiﬁcant 
even at 1%  significance level. A one unit increase in infant mortality rate associates with 0.9 
unit increase in crude birth rate. The ﬁnding is consistent with  the idea that declining child 
mortality increases the supply of children, giving incentives  to limit fertility. 
One unit increase in the industrial workers‟ share associates with 18.4 units increase in 
crude birth rate. This is inconsistent with the expectation that the urban life style which is 
associated with more industrial jobs depresses fertility and opportunity costs for people 
increase. I received a good p-value for the coefficient and the magnitude of the relationship 
seems to be realistic. It tells us that one unit growth of the industrial workers share gives 
18,04 unit growth in CBR. The result doesn‟t confirm my hypothesis made earlier in the part 
of industrialization impact on fertility. However, it is significant finding and below I try to 
explain the possible reasons behind it. The brief explanation can be expressed in the following 
way - rapid growth of jobs‟ supply neutralizes economic uncertainties in people‟s mind and 
this is a reason to have children. Established industrial factories, new plants offered strong 
social benefits for pregnant women. New kinder-gardens were built in selected years, they 
were supported and financed by particular industrial enterprises. The system was built to 
stimulate demand for children. More people had industrial jobs with strong social benefits - 
more children they intended to have. Previous researches have considered capitalistic 
societies, where market uncertainties influence a lot fertility behavior, in case of USSR the 
state has given much of social security, therefore, fertility rises despite rapid urban 
development.  
One unit increase in net migration rate associates with 0.004 units increase in crude 
birth rate (inconsistent with our expectations, insignificant results). The coefficient for net 
migration has high p-values, thus, it cannot be considered as reliable measure of relationship. 
The reasons for such failure can lay in the misspecification issue. Earlier, I stressed that the 
minority of researchers connect migration rates and costs of regulation. The regression output 
illustrates that I have turn to false direction including migration as an independent variable 
into the regression. The mistake is quite evident. Possibly, I made wrong decision based on 
migration hypothesis. 
What about the effect of industrialization in different years. I have to mention that in 
addition to the main model, interaction terms for industrial share in particular five-year period 
were added and new model was estimated. The strongest industrial impact on crude fertility 
the last five year period (1973-1978) had shown. However, the results appeared to be 
statistically insignificant at all levels of significance and I couldn‟t rely on it. 
The coefficient for the Nizhny Novgorod dummy indicates that municipality located n 
Nizhny Novgorod Region expected to have 5.45 children per 1000 population lower crude 
birth rate, having the same industrial share, net migration and infant mortality rate. This result 
approves my hypothesis made in previous chapter. Nizhny Novgorod region was less 
traditional in terms of ideology, thus, it negatively affected fertility comparing with Chuvash 
region, holding other things equal. The degree of difference is quite high – 5.45 children – big 
gap for two neighboring regions with the common infrastructure, trade, cultural exchange and 
population flows. I have mentioned previously significant ethnic differences between two 
regions. The difference in fertility is also a result of differences in traditions, which are set by 
relative religion and ethnicity. 
Year‟s dummies also show expected sign of relationship. Holding other parameters 
fixed (infant mortality, net migration rate, and industrial share) crude birth rates are higher in 
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1958-1963 than later, the most negative impact on crude birth rate has the third five-year 
group 1968-1973, the coefficient for the latest five years has less negative strength than the 
third one. Therefore, the most powerful modernization shift occurred in third five-year period. 
In other words, the concentration and speed of changes during the 1968-1973 were the highest 
for the period and it is reflected in the regression output. 
I discuss the possible explanations of expected and unexpected findings in the next 
section. 
 
6.2. Discussion 
 
Basically, it turns out that the empirical model based on Easterlin-Crimmins approach 
is quite powerful in explaining the crude birth rate. However, I received some empirical 
support that the part describing the costs of fertility control can be improved in my case.  
Obviously, there are differences between more market countries and countries with 
heavy ideological influence in society in part of fertility determinants. Easterlin and Crimmins 
build their model looking at societies with more individualistic pre-transitional regimes, high 
market uncertainties. Russian regions I am looking at have specific set of socio-economic 
parameters which determine their fertility scenarios being deviated from Easterlin and 
Crimmins framework. 
Industrial development, jobs availability and what is the most important - the cheap 
and wide-spread public child-care, public schools, easy access to education - made the 
decision concerning the consumption of alternative goods more simple. People were 
motivated towards having children. Government didn‟t design or implement narrow family 
policies, aimed to facilitate or stop fertility; it was more concentrated on the basic 
improvements of living conditions such as housing construction. The 60s experienced a 
constructing boom when through the whole country millions of houses were built, so called 
“kchruschevki” according to the name of current leader. No doubt, such rapid improvements 
of life stimulated micro fertility decisions. Nonetheless, government actively used cinema-
industry for propagandistic purposes. Although, high fertility was not first declared goal of 
the  60s and 70s government (in contrast with the 80s), the image of big family prevailed in 
all the most consumed movies of that time. 
The most important difference, which makes the soviet case rather specific, is the lack 
of developed consumer markets. The nature of planned economy didn‟t allow people to 
choose consumption patterns by themselves. Moreover, the deficit of standard consumer 
goods usually symbolizing the transformation to modern society (TV, passenger car, free trips 
abroad) motivated people to concentrate on childbearing behavior. Because of the lack of 
more advanced toys for adults, children remained to be the most important source of 
satisfaction in household. Therefore, the demand theory continues to work in case of Soviet 
Russia with some deviations.  
As previous studies have investigated and I have shown earlier, the nature of fertility-
economic development relationship has U-shape form. Fertility declines with the rise of 
income, women employment but it starts to rise near some critical line of social improvement, 
possible by developed public policies as in case of Scandinavia. The phenomenon I observe in 
this study can be to some extent explained by the same theoretical dimension. Introduction of 
parental leave, easy access to kinder-gardens, advanced medicine associated with 
modernization produced substantial incentives not to limit the number of children soon after 
the migration from the rural areas.  In this context, it‟s quite adequate to refer to Mason‟s 
example (2001) from the history of industrialization in Western Europe. By receiving more 
job opportunities, the working classes formed family earlier and in some cases even had more 
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children. Also she explains why higher women labor participation doesn‟t necessary mean 
lower fertility. The role of family system and gender freedom is important in this respect. 
USSR experience proved that women were quite free in their labor opportunities, choosing 
fertility. 
In addition, the way of thinking these people had remained rural some years after the 
migration; it means more traditional approach to family formation. Migrants couldn‟t respond 
to the modern changes immediately. Mental changes in part of family formation is not 
possible to make immediately, it‟s a long process which requires time and will. Those rural 
people came to cities was very conservative in their mind because the life of their parents was 
the best life pattern for them, and the religion meant a lot, despite the fact that it was 
prohibited by the state. Then, the wider possibilities of having children in cities than in 
villages (stable job, income, kinder-gardens, schools) motivated them to increase fertility. The 
next generation of these migrants could change their behavior. Their children didn‟t see the 
economic difficulties living in rural land, they couldn‟t compare, and as a result they adjusted 
the child-bearing behavior to the direction of reduction, enjoying modern life-style.  
1968-1973 period shows the most negative industrial impact on fertility and this is 
quite clear as well. The lag effect is evident. Urban life-style is diffusing in people‟s mind 
gradually not soon after the wave of migration. Additionally, the land issue matters. Land 
reforms are always a source of substantial shifts in fertility patterns experienced by population 
(Mason 2001). The period of 1968-1973 is a time interval when the results of Khrushchev‟s 
land reforms have come into force, suppressing fertility. 
Then, also the spread of television affected family-formation behavior a lot. First 
generation needed more time to establish city life, thus, the time devoted to TV was limited in 
their case in contrast with the next generation. Second city generation experienced easier city-
life, because they used ready life-patterns tested by their parents. So the time for TV, personal 
leisure increased. Definitely, such reality affected child-bearing behavior.  
Therefore, studies in this field should concentrate on cohort analysis. Evidently, there 
are a lot of obstacles in part of data availability to fulfill the detail analysis combining 
longitudinal and cohort dimension. However, the exact conclusions are possible only after 
separating the data for different cohorts as well as finding other clues for understanding the 
regulation part of the model.  
I was not able to solve all empirical problems with the data I had. And of course, the 
study can be improved by using instrumental variables. There are also the reasons to accuse 
me in disproportionate research design. The background section looks quite heavy. I agree but 
in the same time consider the current research structure as the only possible with the goals and 
methods I have.  
Nonetheless, I believe that current analysis is quite good starting base for further 
development in this direction. There is a lack of quantitative historical evidence if it concerns 
the link existed between soviet economic development and demographic outcomes.  I 
received the answer on the main research question – to what extent two Russian regions were 
different in fertility response to modernization during soviet time. My initial expectations are 
confirmed by empirical manipulations. 
Moreover, I received results which to some extent in line with previous research of 
Hondroyiannis (2009), Morrison (2009), Barber (2009), Luis (2009), Dribe (2008). 
I have observed two different scenarios of fertility responses to modernization in 
Russia during 1958-1978. The first one is more modern and the other one is more traditional. 
Both scenarios based on completely different initial backgrounds – more industrial and more 
rural, on different cultural horizons. And the value of the analysis is that I have looked at 
developing and developed fertility regimes (relatively) within one country. Although I don‟t 
receive a full confirmation for the Easterlin and Crimmins model, I obtain an evidence of 
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significant relationship between crude birth rate, infant mortality, industrial share in particular 
municipality. The results allow drawing the main features of two different local demographic 
modernizations, the causalities and evolution of patterns for twenty years. Now there are 
reasons to conclude that industrialization didn‟t depress fertility, but, obviously, it depressed 
infant mortality rates. 
Figure 21. Three possible scenarios of regional fertility response to 
modernization. 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)                                                                (b)                                                           (c) 
Note. The vertical axe displays the strength of response, the horizontal axe reflects years. 
 
The most important finding is that despite different starting points two different 
regions (developed and developing) experienced the same modernization processes, they kept 
the constant distance during twenty years of modernization and finished with the same gap in 
1978. There was gap in term of gross fertility between two regions in 1958 and it remained 
the almost the same in 1978 in spite of twenty years of modern development in both regions. 
Figure 21 shows that we deal with the first scenario labeled by (a).  
We see that even the stronger religious influence in the second region was not able to 
stop the modernization, just slightly decrease its strength. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
estimate the details of such barriers‟ impact quantitatively. 
Finally I summarize, that despite different socio-economic and cultural differences 
two regions show almost the same fertility responses to modernization. Nizhny Novgorod 
indicates slightly stronger response but for illustrative purposes I display parallel and almost 
identical scenarios of fertility responses to modernization. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This work is an attempt to select and analyze two different regional scenarios of 
fertility responses to modernization in Russia during 1958-1978. It empirically tests whether 
the modernization in Soviet Russia affected fertility of two ethnic areas in the same way. 
For these reasons main theoretical approaches which focused on modernization and 
fertility link were considered. Becker presented detail theoretical links which combined 
modern economic development and fertility rates. In contrast, ideational theory considered 
modernization from cultural perspective. Easterlin and Crimmins constructed theoretical 
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model for pair «modernization-fertility» which involved both economic and cultural 
determinants. And this model was implemented for empirical analysis. 
Theoretical model was evaluated through the prism of Russian socio-economic 
background in selected years. Therefore, the main distinguishing features of Russian 
modernization were considered. High speeds, artificial nature, command style of management 
and big cultural variations throughout the country as an inside layer became well-known 
characteristics of soviet modernization. Difficult in its roots and forms socio-economic reality 
affected fertility behavior in Russia during the 1958-1978.   
I investigated the role of regional cultural and economic differences for the fertility 
rates decline. Nizhny Novgorod and Chuvash Republic were taken into consideration. Both 
regions experienced rapid modernization in selected years. 
Data for the two Russian regions were collected from administrative records. The 
panel data were organized and processed in STATA. Then regression model was built on 
existing theoretical framework and previous research. 
I estimated model by two different regression techniques – random effect and fixed-
effect estimators. However, the random effect estimator was accepted finally. 
The main hypothesis of this work was approved and result was statistically significant. 
More modern Nizhny Novgorod Region showed more «modern» fertility outcomes. Nizhny 
Novgorod region associates with lower crude birth rate and infant mortality rate according to 
the model. 
For variable which reflects the share of industrial workers in particular municipality 
positive sign was found. This can be connected with another kind of social reality than 
Easterlin and Crimmins have considered. There is some evidence that selected years have 
pushed people toward larger family in the same time offered large possibilities for industrial 
participation. The question of relationship between crude birth rate and net migration rate 
remained open. 
Developed and developing regions evolve in the same manner, with the same speed 
and scope in 1958-1978 in terms of fertility responses to modernization; they started and 
ended the modernization with the same gap in-between. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Data sources 
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9.2. Country statistics 
Table 9.2.1. Age mortality rates in Russia 
Age group 1958-1959 1965-1966 1969-1970 1975-1976 
0-4 11.9 6.9 6.9 8.7 
5-9 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 
10-14 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
15-19 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 
20-24 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 
25-29 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 
30-34 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 
35-39 3.1 3.2 3.7 3.8 
40-44 4.0 3.9 4.7 5.3 
45-49 5.4 5.1 6.0 6.9 
50-54 7.9 7.9 8.7 9.3 
55-59 11.2 11.1 11.7 13.4 
60-64 17.1 17.2 18.0 18.9 
65-69 25.2 25.5 27.5 28.0 
>70 63.8 65.8 75.7 75.0 
All years 7.4 7.3 8.2 9.4 
Source: Vishnevsky Volkov, 1983, p.115 
Table 9.2.2. Age mortality rates in Russia (urban/rural). 
Age group 1965-1966 1969-1970 1971-1972 
urban rural urban rural urban rural 
0-4 6.1 7.7 6.4 7.3 6.1 7.5 
5-9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 
10-14 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
15-19 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.2 
20-24 1.4 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.2 2.4 
25-29 1.7 2.6 2.0 2.6 1.9 2.7 
30-34 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.2 2.5 3.4 
35-39 3.1 3.5 3.5 4.0 3.4 4.2 
40-44 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.9 4.6 5.2 
45-49 5.1 5.2 5.9 6.1 5.9 6.3 
50-54 8.2 7.6 9.0 8.4 8.8 8.7 
55-59 11.6 10.5 12.4 10.7 12.6 11.1 
60-64 18.5 15.9 19.5 16.3 19.3 16.7 
65-69 28.8 22.6 29.8 25.2 29.1 24.5 
>70 74.1 60.2 78.1 73.6 77.1 72.8 
Source: Vishnevsky, Volkov, 1983, p. 118. 
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 9.3. Nizhny Novgorod Region’s socio-economic profile in 1958-1978. 
 
 9.3.1. Nationalities 
 
1970 1979 
russians 94.4 94.6 
tatars 1.3 1.2 
unkranians 1.3 1.2 
jews 1.3 1 
mordva 0.8 0.7 
belorusians 0.3 0.4 
chuvashis 0.2 0.2 
other 0.4 0.7 
 
9.3.2. Number of cities within the region 
population, thousands 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979 
<20 11 7 11 8 9 
20-50   7 10 11 9 
50-100       3 5 
100-250 1 1 1     
250-500       1 1 
500-1 mln   1 1     
>1 mln       1 1 
 
9.3.3. Gender structure 
Gender 
structure 1959 1970 
males 44% 44% 
females 56% 56% 
 
9.3.4. Educational attainment 
Number of educated people 
per 1000 population 
total urban rural 
1959 1970 1959 1970 1959 1970 
undergraduate 29 55 47 72 8 16 
uncomplet undergraduate 8 9 9 11 6 6 
special secondary 68 104 95 126 39 52 
secondary 60 139 84 168 33 70 
uncomplete secondary 245 310 292 331 191 262 
 
9.3.5. Women labor-participation 
Share of women 
labour in total work-
force,% 1965 1970 
all sectors 53 54 
industry 48 49 
agriculture 57 52 
transport 29 30 
53 
 
communication 69 75 
construction 35 31 
retail 88 89 
maintanance 55 56 
housing and utilities 53 56 
health system 89 88 
education 76 75 
art 44 48 
science 45 47 
finance 77 82 
state service 60 67 
 
9.3.6. Child paid-care 
Number 
of kinder-
gardens 
1927 1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 
42 472 574 764 984 1164 
 
9.3.7. Schools 
Secondary schools 1914 1927 1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 
Number of schools 2327 2515 3150 3696 3552 3365 2951 
Number of pupils 150 220 604 611 597 743 691 
 
9.3.8. Industry 
Distribution of 
workers in sectors 1940 1970 1975 1977 
industry 54 48.4 46.9 46.6 
agriculture 3.5 6.8 6 5.9 
transport 8.1 7 7.3 7.5 
communications 1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
construction 5.5 7.9 8.4 8.3 
retail 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.9 
housing and utilities 4 2.9 3.3 3.4 
health system 3.4 4.7 4.7 4.6 
education 6.6 7.2 7.1 7.1 
art 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
acience 0.4 2.7 3.2 3.3 
finances 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 
state service 3.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 
 
9.3.9. Births 
mother's 
age at 
first birth 1978 
<16 0 
16-17 1.4 
18-19 11.1 
54 
 
20-24 47.1 
25-29 27 
30-34 8.7 
35-39 3.5 
40-44 1 
45-49 0.1 
>50 0 
 
9.3.10. Divorces 
Years 
Number of 
divorces for 
1000 
marriages 
1970 256 
1971 253 
1972 263 
1973 251 
1974 257 
1975 264 
1976 296 
1977 312 
1978 308 
 
9.3.11. Deaths 
mortality 
causes 
urban rural 
70 75 76 77 70 75 76 77 
infections 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.9 2 2.1 1.7 
oncology 16.2 16.9 17.6 17.9 14.3 17.6 17.6 17.2 
heart 39.3 46.6 49.3 51.6 67.1 87.4 93.6 100.1 
repiratory 7.5 6.1 6.8 6 15.8 14.6 16.3 15.6 
accidents 10 11.3 12.3   11.1 15.6 16   
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9.4. Description of Crude birth rate and infant mortality rate, both regions, 1958-1978. 
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